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              Prethodno priopćenje 
  
DOES LABOUR TAXATION AFFECT UNEMPLOYMENT?  




The paper examines the issue of labour taxation of Croatian worker in comparison to 
workers in OECD and EU Member States. By using hierarchical cluster analysis it studies the 
relations between tax wedge and labour market outcomes, whereas with panel regression 
analysis, performed on data for 39 countries during 2000–2008 period, estimates the impact 
of tax wedge on unemployment rate. The empirical estimates show that Croatia classifies 
among countries with higher unemployment and lower employment rate, characterized with 
higher tax wedge. Furthermore, the estimates of the regression analysis showed that the tax 
wedge at all three wage levels (i.e. 67 %, 100 % and 167 % of average wage) has a 
significant positive impact on unemployment rate. This signifies that Croatia, as other studied 
countries, should continue with reduction of tax wedge, as this would alleviate unemployment 
problems and stimulate job creation.  
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JEL classification: J30, J38, H24. 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of labour taxation and its possible effects on labour market outcomes has been 
a subject of range of studies in recent years. Several studies find that a decline in tax wedge 
may alleviate unemployment, stimulate job creation and by this affect employment and 
improve general economic performance. Namely, by creating a wedge between labour costs 
and real consumption net wage, taxes on labour in imperfectly flexible labour markets reduce 
demand for labour (if demand for labour is imperfectly inelastic) and employment and 
therefore increase unemployment (Vodopivec, 2005).  
The main objective of this paper is to study the labour taxation and labour market 
outcomes (in terms of employment and unemployment rate) in Croatia from an international 
comparative perspective. Moreover, the paper deals with the relation between tax wedge and 
labour market performance in member countries of Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), European Union (EU) and Croatia, giving the latter a special 
attention. Most importantly, the paper tests the hypothesis whether and how taxes on labour 
influence unemployment rates in studied countries.  
In order to explain the characteristics of taxes levied on labour and indicators of labour 
market performance we apply basic descriptive statistics. To identify groups of countries that 
are similar to each other with regard to employment and unemployment rate we use 
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hierarchical cluster analysis (based on Ward’s method and squared Euclidean distance). To 
study the impact of tax wedge on unemployment rate we employ panel regression analysis on 
the sample of 39 countries (i.e. OECD and EU Member States plus Croatia) for the period 
2000–2008. We expect a positive association between labour taxation and unemployment 
rate.  
The added value of this paper in comparison to previous studies on labour taxation in 
Croatia4
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 gives a brief overview 
of previous empirical studies on the impact of labour taxation on labour market performance, 
followed by the presentation of data and methodology in Section 3. Section 4 presents basic 
statistics and trends in labour taxation in Croatia in comparative international perspective. 
Section 5 is devoted to classification of chosen countries into clusters using hierarchical 
cluster analysis. Section 6 tests causalities between labour taxation and unemployment using 
panel regression analysis. Section 7 concludes and gives relevant policy recommendations. 
 is twofold. Firstly, we analyse the issue of taxation of Croatian worker in broader 
international comparative perspective, taking into account different levels of average wage 
and the latest available data. Secondly, we investigate the impact of labour taxation on 
unemployment, showing on the importance of reducing labour taxation for solving 
unemployment problems in Croatia. 
 
2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
A simple theoretical framework of labour supply and demand presumes that an increase 
of tax wedge can be represented by a downward shift in the labour demand curve. The extent 
to which the tax wedge affects employment is highly dependent on the elasticities of the 
labour supply and demand curve, implying that the more elastic is the labour supply curve 
(and/or demand curve), the higher is the negative effect of tax wedge on employment (see 
Góra et al., 2006).  
Tax wedge-employment/unemployment relationship has been a subject of several 
macroeconomic empirical studies, mostly based on different panel datasets of countries. 
Despite differences in the structure of econometric models, the majority of studies pointed on 
the existence of a negative relationship between tax wedge and employment. The brief 
structure and results of these studies are summarized in de Haan et al. (2003), Nickell (2003) 
and OECD (2006). Yet, the extent to which an increase in tax wedge results in lower 
employment and/or higher unemployment appears to be affected by institutional features of 
the individual labour markets such as labour market flexibility, collective bargaining, 
regulations in the field of minimum wages and unemployment benefits, skill level of the 
labour force (Bertoncelj, 2010), tax incidence share and progressivity, wage formation 
structure, active and other labour market policies and institutions.  
In one of the most cited studies, Nickell and Layard (1999) showed by using the panel 
analysis on 20 OECD countries between 1983–1994 that a decrease in average tax wedge 
(that includes payroll, income and consumption taxes) for 5 percentage points would reduce 
the unemployment rate by 13 %. Likewise in one of the following studies, Nickell (2003) 
reported that an increase in tax wedge by 10 percentage point would result in the reduction of 
labour input of the working age population by somewhere between 1 and 3 %. By comparing 
the big three countries of continental Europe (France, Germany and Italy) with the United 
States, Nickell (2003) also showed that the difference in tax wedge (around 16 percentage 
points) explains around one quarter of the overall difference in the employment rate. The 
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remained difference could be explained by substantial differences in the social security 
system and in other labour market institutions. 
Alesina and Perotti (1997) on the sample of 14 OECD countries empirically confirmed 
the theoretical model which showed that an increase in redistribution financed by an increase 
in labour taxes leads to an increase in the unit labour cost and therefore induces a loss of 
competitiveness causing a reduction in the demand for exports and a fall in employment (see 
Kavčič and Bertoncelj (2010) for a review some of these issues in Slovenian organizations). 
On the other hand, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) showed that the negative effect of 
labour taxation on employment and growth is a European phenomenon (correlation is strong 
and evident in highly unionized countries of continental Europe and much less so in OECD 
countries with competitive labour markets and in the Scandinavian countries with highly 
centralized trade unions). Their empirical research on the sample of 14 OECD industrial 
countries during the 1965–1991 period has pointed that the rise of 10 percentage points in the 
rate of effective labour taxes can account for a 4 percentage points increase in European 
unemployment.  
In the empirical study of Bassanini and Duval (2006) performed on the sample of 21 
OECD countries during 1983 and 2003 it is shown that in the “average” OECD country, high 
and long-lasting unemployment benefits and high tax wedge increase aggregate 
unemployment and lower employment prospects. Namely, a 10 percentage points reduction of 
tax wedge would reduce equilibrium unemployment by 2.8 percentage points and increase the 
employment rate by a larger 3.7 percentage points (due to positive impact on participation). 
By contrast, highly centralized and/or coordinated wage bargaining systems are estimated to 
reduce unemployment. 
Similar estimates of the impact of tax wedge on labour market performance were 
obtained in the studies based on the samples of EU Member States. For example, Góra et al. 
(2006) showed a negative effect of tax wedge on employment growth in eight New Member 
States (NMS) and provided evidence that tax wedge more strongly affects employment rates 
among low-skilled workers, but high-skilled are rather immune from this effect. A significant 
negative impact of higher tax wedge on labour force participation and employment rate 
(especially for elderly) in NMS-8 has been suggested also by Võrk et al. (2007). Their 
estimates obtained in the panel data analysis of eight NMS between 1996 and 2004 showed 
that a reduction of the tax wedge by 1 percentage point could increase employment rate by 
about 0.2–0.7 percentage points. A detrimental effect of high tax wedges and/or inappropriate 
benefits systems on the generation of desirable labour market outcomes (employment, 
unemployment and inactivity) on the sample of ten Central and Eastern EU Member States 
(CEE-10) was also shown in the study of Behar (2009). 
Results are not much different for Croatia. For example, Grdović Gnip and Tomić 
(2010) and Šeparović (2009) with hierarchical cluster analysis showed that Croatia places 
itself among countries with high tax wedge, which are characterised with higher 
unemployment and lower employment rates. Also Urban (2009) concluded that Croatian tax 
wedge is very high in comparison to some of the OECD countries and that the long-term 
development of Croatia will depend on reducing the tax wedge and on other vital reforms. 
Similarly Nestić (1998) suggested that Croatia should lower the taxation of labour, however 
not to lower unemployment, but primarily to increase the competitiveness of Croatian 
economy and to reduce informal sector employment.  
A brief review of the literature suggests that tax wedge has been one of the significant 
reasons for unemployment among countries. However, even the estimates of a negative 
impact of tax wedge on labour market outcomes may be relatively strong; they are subjected 
to criticism due to robustness of data and empirical model (see for example Blanchard, 2006).  
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3  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
In order to be comparable among countries, we base our analysis of labour taxation on 
the average tax wedge indicator calculated on the basis of OECD methodology (see OECD, 




PIT SSC SSC PT CB
ATW
w PIT SSC SSC PT
+ + + −
=
+ + + +  
where ATW stands for average tax wedge, PIT is personal income tax, SSCe social 
security contributions paid by employees, SSCf social security contributions paid by 
firms/employer, PT payroll tax paid by employers, CB cash benefits and w net wage. 
In the analysis we observe the tax wedge for an average worker, single, without children 
and employed in industry Sectors C-K,5
The methodological scope of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we examine the size of tax 
wedge, employment rate and unemployment rate in Croatia and in OECD and EU Member 
States in 2008
 at different wage levels (i.e. 67 %, 100 % and 167 % 
of average wage).  
6
Because of heterogeneity in the analysed data, we further apply hierarchical cluster 
analysis (based on Ward’s method and squared Euclidean distance) to identify whether there 
are more homogenous groups of countries. Cluster analysis is performed on 39 countries 
(OECD and EU Member States plus Croatia) and includes employment and unemployment 
rate as dependent characteristics.  
 by using basic descriptive statistics.  
In the last part of our empirical analysis, we study the impact of tax wedge on 
unemployment rate. Following the macroeconomic empirical studies on this issue (see for 
example Nickell and Layard, 1999; Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; Belot and van Ours, 2004; 
Võrk et al., 2007; Žižmond and Novak, 2006) we employ panel regression analysis, 
performed on the sample of 39 countries (OECD and EU Member States plus Croatia) 
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. We formed a regression model (2) with the following specifications:  
, 
where UR denotes unemployment rate in country i at time t, TW stands for tax wedge, 
EPL for employment protection legislation index, GDPpc denotes gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, IR is inflation rate and LP is labour productivity. Parameter e stands for 
stochastic disturbances. Moreover, we also introduce dummy variable D in the interactive and 
multiplicative form DTW (D multiplied by TW) in order to control for differences between 
high tax wedge countries (dummy variable takes the value 1) and low tax wedge countries 
(dummy variable takes the value 0). All variables were logarithmised. In parallel, we repeat 
the panel regression analysis by using employment rate as a dependent variable.  
                                               
5 According to NACE Rev. 2, sectors C-K were replaced by sectors B-N. 
6 We focus on data for 2008 in order to perform an analysis comparable among all countries included. Namely, 
data on tax wedge for 2009 are not yet available for all EU Member States.  
7 The decision to use panel regression model with random effects instead of fixed effects was based on the 
estimates of Hausman test. The use of random effects model was confirmed by the Breusch and Pagan 
Langragian multiplier test. The presence of heteroskedacity was confirmed by likelihood-ratio test, whereas 
Wooldrige test showed that data do not have first-order autocorrelation. 
(2) 
(1) 
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Data on unemployment and employment were collected on the basis of Labour Force 
Surveys and refer to the age group 15 to 64. Explanatory variable tax wedge refers to labour 
taxation of a single production worker without children. We performed three separate 
regression analyses differing only in the level of tax wedge, by which each referred to one 
wage level. We therefore obtained estimates for tax wedge at 67 %, 100 % and 167 % of 
average earnings. The other explanatory variables represent control variables. EPL index8
The data needed for empirical analysis were obtained from three main sources: 
 
presents a measure of labour market flexibility and covers three different aspects of 
employment protection: (i) individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts; (ii) 
additional costs for collective dismissals; and (iii) regulation of temporary contracts. As a 
measure of control for macroeconomic effects that may influence labour market developments 
we included inflation rate (in order to take into consideration effects in monetary or fiscal 
policy) and GDP per capita (expressed in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)). Labour 
productivity is measured as GDP in PPS per hour worked. The data on labour productivity 
were obtained from The Conference Board (2010) statistical database.  
• for OECD countries: OECD official databases (OECD.Stat, 2010) and official reports 
(OECD, 2008 and 2009a, b, c); 
• for EU Member States: Eurostat (2010) and official reports of the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2009a, b and c); 
• for Croatia: official databases and reports of Central Bureau of Statistics of the Republic 
of Croatia (2010). 
The analysis focuses on the size of the tax wedge-unemployment relationship on the 
labour demand side and does not study in detail the effects of factors at the labour supply side 
and other labour market institutions.  
 
4  TAXATION OF LABOUR IN CROATIA IN INTERNATIONAL 
 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Croatian legislation referring to income taxation and social security contribution system 
underwent several changes through the last 20 years (see Grdović Gnip and Tomić, 2010). 
According to Nestić (1998), these changes could create an atmosphere of instability, which 
discouraged both employers and employees from quickly and optimally responding to market 
signals. Such instability may decrease companies’ business expectations which may reduce 
the companies’ willingness to employ (Stubelj, 2010). Nevertheless, the legislation changes, 
in general, resulted in a decline of tax wedge. Namely, from 2000 to 2008 the tax wedge at 
the 67 % of average earnings in Croatia declined by approximately 6 % or 2.3 percentage 
points. Decline in tax wedge was higher at average wage level and 167 % of average wage, as 
it decreased by approximately 8 % (see Figure 1; data for EU-27 are inserted for 
comparison).9
                                               
8 Until today OECD presented three versions of EPL index calculations. In this analysis we included the second 
version of the EPL index (see OECD, 2010). 
 A high decline of tax wedge in 2000 and 2001 can be reasoned with an increase 
of personal allowance, changes in the marginal tax rates and reduction of employer's 
contributions. In the following year, the tax wedge slightly increased due to increase of 
employer's contributions. In 2003 personal allowance increased and employee's contributions 
decreased, so the tax wedge recorded a pin drop (it fell under the average of EU). From 2003 
9 Between 2000 and 2008, the tax wedge in the EU-27 decreased, on average, by approximately 6 % at all three 
wage levels. A stronger decline was noticed in CEE countries together with three Nordic countries, in which the 
tax wedge, on average, decreased by 3.2 percentage points (or 0.36 percentage point/year). To a large extent, the 
reduction in tax wedge is almost entirely driven by the reduction in personal income taxation and in social 
security contributions of employers. 
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to 2008, despite the further increase in personal allowances (in 2005, 2006 and 2008), the tax 
wedge was slightly increasing due to the growth in gross wages. In 2009 Croatia introduced a 
special “crisis tax” levied on the net wage in order to mitigate the impacts of the financial 
crisis. According to Grdović Gnip and Tomić (2010), the introduction of the “crisis tax” 
would increase the tax wedge at 100 % average earnings for additional 1.2 percentage points 
(from 40.1 % (without “crisis tax”) to 41.3 %) in 2009. 
 
Figure 1: Tax wedge at different wage levels from 2000 to 2008 in Croatia and EU-27, in % 
Sources: Eurostat, 2010; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010; authors’ calculations. 
 
The dynamics of tax wedge between 2000 and 2008 presented in the previous figure 
shows that Croatian worker, receiving average or 167 % of average wage, was less taxed than 
the average EU worker until 2007. Situation changed in 2008 due to higher decrease of 
average labour taxation in EU-27, mostly due to larger decrease in Cyprus, Poland, Bulgaria 
and in some other EU countries comparing to 2007. As can be seen from Table 1, in 2008, the 
low wage worker bore a higher tax burden than the average worker in EU-15, however lower 
than in CEE countries. Similar is true for high-wage workers. For worker with average wage, 
the taxation is, on average, much higher among old EU Member States and also CEE 
countries than in Croatia.10
                                               
10 Among EU Member States (ranked according to tax wedge level from highest to lowest), Croatia places on the 
16th position at the 67 % average wage level, 18th position at the 100 % average wage level and on the 15th 
position at the 167 % average wage level. Among OECD countries (ranked according to tax wedge level from 
highest to lowest), it places on the 12th position at the 67 % of average wage level and on the 13th position at the 
100 % and 167 % of average wage. 
 Nevertheless, the Croatian workers are exposed to considerably 
higher taxation if compared to OECD countries that are not members of the EU. 
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Table 1: International comparison of tax wedge at different wage levels, employment and 
unemployment rates, 2008 (in %) 
 Tax wedge at  
Group/country1 
67 % of 
average 
wage 
100 % of 
average 
wage 







OECD 33.5 37.4 41.9 68.3 5.8 
   non-EU OECD 24.8 28.1 32.3 70.3 4.7 
   EU OECD 38.6 42.8 47.5 67.1 6.4 
EU-27 36.5 39.9 43.8 66.4 6.3 
EU-15 38.1 42.4 47.0 68.4 6.4 
CEE-10 39.5 41.9 44.0 63.9 6.5 
Croatia 38.5 40.1 44.4 57.8 8.6 
Note:1 OECD stands for 30 OECD member countries. Non-EU OECD includes 11 OECD member countries that 
are not members of the EU, whereas EU OECD includes 19 OECD member countries that are also members of 
the EU. EU-15 refers to EU Member States that become members of the EU prior to 2004. CEE-10 includes 10 
Central and Eastern EU Member States that joined EU after 2004. 
Sources: Eurostat, 2010; OECD.Stat, 2010; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010; authors’ calculations. 
 
Croatia, as all other OECD and EU Member States (except for Bulgaria, which records 
equal tax wedge at different wage levels), has a progressive tax wedge, implying that tax 
wedge increases with an increase of wage level (see Figure 2). The progressivity of tax wedge 
stems from the progressive income tax rates, which, on the other hand, result in a 
redistributive effect, since they reduce the inequality of income distribution. Comparing to 
chosen groups, Croatia exhibits lower tax progressivity. This was confirmed also by Kosi and 
Bojnec (2010), who by calculating the measure of elasticity of after-tax wage to total labour 
costs (also known as CRIP) showed that, except for single parents with two children, taxation 
of wages in Croatia exhibits low tax progressivity. 
 
Figure 2: Progressivity of tax wedge in selected groups of countries and in Croatia, 2008 ( %) 
Sources: Eurostat, 2010; OECD.Stat, 2010; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010; authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Table 2 presents the structure of tax wedge at different wage levels in Croatia and 
selected groups of countries.  




Table 2: Decomposition of tax wage at different wage levels in selected groups of countries 
and Croatia, 2008, in % 
 non-EU 




67 % of average earnings 
PIT 44.9 29.4 27.1 20.9 17.6 
Employee SSC 25.6 33.9 26.5 26.3 44.3 
Employer SSC 
plus payroll tax 29.5 36.7 46.4 52.8 38.1 
Total2 100 100 100 100 100 
 100 % of average earnings 
PIT 52.6 38.7 34.6 25.4 19.3 
Employee SSC 22.7 30.0 23.2 24.9 42.5 
Employer SSC 
plus payroll tax 24.7 31.2 42.3 49.7 33.2 
Total2 100 100 100 100 100 
 167 % of average earnings 
PIT 62.5 50.3 45.6 29.0 28.5 
Employee SSC 18.4 24.6 18.3 23.6 38.4 
Employer SSC 
plus payroll tax 19.0 25.1 36.1 47.4 33.1 
Total2 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes:  
1 Abbreviation PIT refers to personal income tax, SSC to social security contributions.  
2 Due to rounding total may differ one tenth of percentage point from aggregate of income 
tax, social security contributions and payroll tax. 
Sources: Eurostat, 2010; OECD.Stat, 2010; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010; authors’ 
calculations. 
In most of the EU Member States and also in Croatia social security contributions 
represent a major part of the tax wedge. Social security contributions and personal income tax 
are more evenly represented in tax wedge in OECD member countries that are not members 
of the EU. What’s more, by increasing the wage level, the share of personal income tax in the 
structure of tax wedge in these countries increases profoundly. For example, in non-EU 
OECD countries personal income tax presents 62.5 % of the overall tax wedge at the 167 % 
wage level, whereas in EU-15 45.6 %, in CEE-10 yet only 29.0 %. Croatia exhibits similar 
share of personal income tax in overall tax wedge as CEE countries at the 167 % wage level, 
however at the other two wage levels the share is a lot lower (see Table 2). As regards the 
distribution of tax burden between the employers and employees, in most the countries, also 
in Croatia, the greater part of the tax burden is transferred to employees. An exception to this 
may present the CEE countries, as the employers bear 52 % of tax wedge at the 67 % of 
average earnings, however this share declines with an increase of wage level.  
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5  RELATIONS BETWEEN TAX WEDGE, EMPLOYMENT AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
A close look at the data in Table 1 suggests that countries not only differ in tax wedge 
but also in employment and unemployment rate, respectively. The bivariate analysis 
performed on 39 countries (all member countries of OECD and EU and Croatia) pointed on 
the existence of statistically significant positive correlation between tax wedge (at all wage 
levels) and unemployment rate.11
To identify groups of countries that are similar to each other according to 
unemployment and employment rate, a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method and 
Euclidean distance as a measure function has been applied.
 On the contrary, the correlation between tax wedge and 
employment rate was negative, however not statistically significant.  
12 As can be seen from Figure 3, 
countries grouped into two main clusters depending on the size of unemployment and 
employment rate. The first cluster includes 27 countries (i.e. 69 % of the whole sample), 
which recorded higher employment rate and lower unemployment rate. The second cluster is 
a group of 12 countries, which exhibit the opposite characteristics, i.e. lower employment rate 
and higher unemployment rate. When comparing these two clusters of countries according to 
the level of tax wedge, it is noticeable that low tax wedge at all studied wage levels 
corresponds to lower unemployment and higher employment rate, and vice versa (see Table 
3). The Mann-Whitney U test13
 
 confirmed that the differences between clusters in 
employment and unemployment rate and in tax wedge (at 67 % and 100 % average wage) are 
statistically significant at significance level of 5 %. The obtained results are comparable with 
the results of various empirical studies on the sample of OECD and EU countries (for 
example Nickell and Layard, 1999; Nickel, 2003; Daveri and Tabellini, 2000, Dolenc and 
Vodopivec, 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Šeparović, 2009; Dolenc and Laporšek, 2010; 
Grdović Gnip and Tomić, 2010; Jerman et al., 2010; etc.). 
                                               
11 Pearson coefficient between unemployment rate and tax wedge at 67 %, 100 % and 167 % of average earnings 
amounted 0.380, 0.357 and 0.333, respectively, at significance level of 5 %.  
12 The variables used were standardized in order to avoid the influence of different averages on the relative 
importance of the variable. 
13 The Mann-Whitney U non-parametric test was used due to small number of studied countries.  
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AT - Austria, AUT - Australia, BE - Belgium, BG - Bulgaria, CA - Canada, CH - 
Switzerland, CY - Cyprus, CZ - Czech Republic, DE - Germany, DK - Denmark, EE - 
Estonia, EL - Greece, ES - Spain, FI - Finland, FR - France, HR - Croatia, HU - Hungary, IE - 
Ireland, IS - Iceland, IT - Italy, JP - Japan, KO - Korea, LT - Lithuania, LU - Luxemburg, LV 
- Latvia, ME - Mexico, MT - Malta, NL - Netherlands, NO - Norway, NZ - New Zealand, PL 
- Poland, PT - Portugal, RO - Romania, SE - Sweden, SI - Slovenia, SK - Slovak Republic, 
TK - Turkey, UK - United Kingdom, USA - United States of America.  
Source: Eurostat, 2010; OECD.Stat, 2010; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010; authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of clusters obtained by the hierarchical clustering using Ward's 
method and squared Euclidean distance 


















Mean 30.8 35.3 39.6 71.0 4.9 UK, USA, EE, FI, 
IE, SE, CA, LV, 
PT, DE, CZ, SI, 
CY, AT, JP, AUT, 
NZ, BG, LT, LU, 
KO, ME, NL, NO, 
DK, CH, IS 
Media
n 32.9 36.8 41.7 70.9 4.5 
Std. 




Mean 38.8 42.5 46.1 59.0 8.1 
BE, FR, EL, HU, 
HR, IT, PL, MT, 
RO, ES, SK, TK 
Media
n 38.6 41.2 44.0 59.1 7.6 
Std. 
















AT - Austria, AUT - Australia, BE - Belgium, BG - Bulgaria, CA - Canada, CH - 
Switzerland, CY - Cyprus, CZ - Czech Republic, DE - Germany, DK - Denmark, EE - 
Estonia, EL - Greece, ES - Spain, FI - Finland, FR - France, HR - Croatia, HU - Hungary, IE - 
Ireland, IS - Iceland, IT - Italy, JP - Japan, KO - Korea, LT - Lithuania, LU - Luxemburg, LV 
- Latvia, ME - Mexico, MT - Malta, NL - Netherlands, NO - Norway, NZ - New Zealand, PL 
- Poland, PT - Portugal, RO - Romania, SE - Sweden, SI - Slovenia, SK - Slovak Republic, 
TK - Turkey, UK - United Kingdom, USA - United States of America.  
Sources: Eurostat, 2010; OECD.Stat, 2010; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010; authors’ 
calculations. 
Croatia was grouped among countries with lower employment rate and higher 
unemployment rate which exhibit high tax wedge. Namely, Croatia recorded one of the 
highest unemployment rate and lowest employment rates among chosen groups in 2008.14 
However, there are eight low tax wedge countries that exhibit higher tax wedge at 67 % and 
100 % wage level (and nine countries at the tax wedge at 100 % wage level) than Croatia.15
Using the classification obtained by cluster analysis, we further performed a 
discriminant analysis for each of the studied wage levels. The following functions of 
discriminant analysis were obtained: 
 
Discriminant function 1: 67%ˆ 6.378 0.028 0.132 0.268Z TW ER UR= + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅                           
(3) 
Discriminant function 2: 100%ˆ 5.988 0.038 0.133 0.254Z TW ER UR= + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅                          
(4) 
                                               
14 Among chosen countries (ranked according to unemployment rate from highest to lowest), Croatia with 8.6 % 
unemployment rate places on the 4th position (after Spain (11.4 %), Turkey (11.2 %) and Slovak republic 
(9.5 %)). With regard to employment rate (ranked from lowest to highest), Croatia (57.8 %) also places on the 4th 
position, after Turkey (44.9 %), Malta (55.3 %) and Hungary (56.7 %). 
15 Lower tax wedge countries with higher tax wedge than Croatia are Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland), Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovenia.  
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Discriminant function 3: 167%ˆ 5.920 0.040 0.135 0.254Z TW ER UR= + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅                          
(5) 
Legend: TW67% – tax wedge at 67 % average wage; TW100% – tax wedge at 100 % average 
wage; TW167% – tax wedge at 167 % average wage; UR – unemployment rate, ER – 
employment rate. 
Note: Cut-off value for is 0. Countries with positive Z have high tax wedge, high 
unemployment rate and low employment rate, and vice versa. 
 
The low tax wedge countries with high employment and low unemployment rate 
demonstrated a negative discriminant score, whereas the high tax wedge group of countries 
with low employment and high unemployment rate demonstrate a positive discriminant score. 
The analysis showed that the discriminant function divided chosen countries in the same 
groups as cluster analysis with the exception of Germany and Lithuania.16
 
 This implies that 
probability of a country to be classified as a high tax wedge country with low employment 
and high unemployment rate increases if tax wedge increases (which, according to theoretical 
and empirical expectations, causes the decrease of employment and increase of 
unemployment rate, pushing up the probability even higher). However, the causality is not a 
clear cut. 
6  THE IMPACT OF TAX WEDGE ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
A bivariate correlation analysis pointed on the existence of statistically significant 
correlation between tax wedge (at all wage levels) and unemployment rate (see Section 5). To 
check the relation between tax wedge and unemployment rate in more detail we conducted 
panel regression analysis on the data for chosen 39 countries during 2000–2008 period. 
As seen in Table 4, the estimates of the panel regression analysis, allowing for random 
effects, confirmed a significant positive impact of tax wedge on unemployment rate at studied 
wage levels. Assuming that a worker with 67 % of average wage is the most representative,17
                                               
16 Both Lithuania and Germany were classified among low tax wedge countries due to relatively high 
unemployment rates (7.6 % in Germany and 5.9 % in Lithuania). However, both countries record negative 
discriminant scores (0.586 for Lithuania in discriminant function 1; 0.493 for Germany and 0.521 for Lithuania 
in discriminant function 2), as both countries exhibit tax wedge that is above average of high tax wedge group of 
countries. 
 
the results suggest that a 10 % increase in labour taxation implies a 4 % increase in 
unemployment rate, ceteris paribus. The impact of increasing tax wedge on unemployment is 
higher for high-wage workers, confirming that the elasticities between tax wedge and 
unemployment rate are increasing in wage.  
17 The real picture of wage distribution in the economy could be given by the median values of incomes. As the 
data on median of wages are in most countries not available for the studied period, we believe that the indicator 
of 67% of average wage is more closely to the actual distribution of wages. For example, in Slovenia the median 
of annual gross earnings amounted about 79 % in 2006 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2009). 
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Single person without children 
% of average 
earnings 67 % 100 % 167 % 
logTW 0.418* 0.603** 0.781** 
logEPL 0.018 -0.012 -0.024 
logGDPpc -0.489* -0.489* -0.459* 
logIR -0.085** -0.086** -0.088** 
logLP 0.057 -0.030 -0.085 
D 0.272* 0.908 0.934 
DTW 0.003 -0.014 -0.013 
Constant 5.094** 4.752** 3.918 
R2:  0.590 0.638 0.627 
Significance level: *5 %, **1 %. 
Notes: All variables were logarithmised. Explanation of abbreviations is available in Section 
3. 
Sources: authors’ calculations. 
 
In parallel to the above analysis, we employed the second panel regression analysis 
using an employment rate as a dependent variable and leaving other explanatory variables the 
same. The estimates have showed an existence of a minor negative, however statistically 
insignificant impact of tax wedge of representative workers with 100 % and 167 % of average 
earnings on employment rate.  
 
7  CONCLUSION 
 
The paper examines the issue of labour taxation of Croatian worker in comparison to 
workers in OECD and EU Member States, studies the relations between tax wedge and labour 
market outcomes (employment and unemployment rate) and analyses the impact of tax wedge 
on unemployment in chosen countries.  
The estimates of the empirical analysis showed that the level of labour taxation in 
Croatia is comparable to that in most of the OECD and EU Member States. Namely, Croatia 
recorded a lower tax wedge for a worker with 100 % of average earnings than EU-15 or CEE 
countries. The taxation of labour was also higher in CEE countries than in Croatia when 
observing low- and high-wage workers. On the other hand, the Croatian workers are exposed 
to considerably higher taxation if compared to non-EU OECD countries. The tax wedge is 
expected to increase in 2009 and 2010 due to the introduction of special “crisis” tax. Cluster 
analysis performed on the OECD and EU Member States plus Croatia showed that a high 
unemployment rate and low employment rate is associated with higher tax wedge and vice 
versa. Croatia was placed among countries with higher tax wedge. As hierarchical cluster 
analysis gave us only an indication on relation between labour taxation and labour market 
outcomes and does not present a general rule, a further panel regression analysis was 
performed. The estimates of the regression analysis showed that the tax wedge at all three 
wage levels (i.e. 67 %, 100 % and 167 % of average wage) has a significant positive impact 
on unemployment rate in chosen countries. This signifies that lowering the level of labour 
taxation should result in a decline of unemployment rate. The findings also pointed on 
possible negative impact of tax wedge on employment rate, yet it was statistically 
insignificant. 
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As Croatia is in its way to become a member of the EU, it should follow the policy 
recommendations of the EU on the reduction of tax wedge. Moreover, weak employment and 
elevated unemployment rate remain a particular concern in Croatia. Namely, the employment 
rate in 2008 amounts 57.8 % and is one of the lowest rates among OECD countries and EU 
Member States. On the other hand, the unemployment rate in 2008 amounted 8.6 % and is 
therefore 2.8 percentage points higher than the average of OECD countries and 2.4 points 
higher than the average in EU-27. Besides high unemployment rate, which additionally 
increased due to the global economic recession, a problem presents also a high inactivity 
among the working-age population that amounted to 37 % in 2008. The reduction in tax 
wedge may therefore decrease rather high unemployment rate in Croatia. Moreover, it could 
also contribute to the improvement of its economic situation by increasing productivity and 
competitiveness. Special emphasis in tax wedge reduction should be put on the lowering of 
the social security contributions, especially those paid by employees, what would require 
reforms in health and pension insurance system. However, we should keep in mind that the 
tax wedge is not sufficient measure to increase employment, as the high unemployment rate is 
also the consequence of high unemployment benefits, wage negation system, employment 
protection legislation, pension system, economic performance, etc. Moreover, the labour 
taxation, especially social security contributions, presents important budget revenue. As the 
Croatian budget is, according to Grdović Gnip and Tomić (2010) socially oriented and social 
security contributions present an important component of the budget, it is unlikely that in near 
future Croatia would lower its tax burden.  
To conclude, the findings of this paper are, in general, in line with previous empirical 
research, as the empirical estimates confirm the detrimental effect of tax wedge on 
unemployment. Howsoever, one has to remember of the limitations of these findings deriving 
from the availability of good time series information on tax wedge, its composition, and other 
labour market outcomes. The analysis also does not take into the account the effect of global 
economic and financial crisis, as its impact on real economy were not evident in year 2008. 
Therefore, a further analysis on a country by country basis and analysis considering the 
effects of economic and financial crisis are needed. Yet the data that will reflect the latter will 
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UTJEČE LI OPOREZIVANJE RADA NA NEZAPOSLENOST? HRVATSKI RADNIK 
U MEĐUNARODNOJ PERSPEKTIVI 
 
SAŽETAK 
Rad istražuje pitanje oporezivanja rada hrvatskih radnika u usporedbi s radnicima 
zemalja OECD i EU. Koristeći hijerarhijsku klaster analizu proučava se odnos između 
poreznog klina i ishoda tržišta rada, dok se panelnom regresijskom analizom, primijenjenom 
na podacima za 39 zemalja u periodu od 2000-2008, procjenjuje učinak poreznog klina na 
stopu nezaposlenosti. Empirijske procjene pokazuju da se Hrvatska svrstava među zemlje s 
višom nezaposlenosti i nižom stopom zaposlenosti, koju karakterizira viši porezni klin. 
Nadalje, procjene regresijske analize pokazale su da porezni klin na sve tri razine plaća 
(odnosno, 67%, 100% i 167% prosjećne plaće) ima značajan pozitivni učinak na stopu 
nezaposlenosti. To znači da Hrvatska, kao i druge proučavane zemlje, treba nastaviti sa 
smanjivanjem poreznog klina jer će to umanjiti probleme nezaposlenosti i potaknuti stvaranje 
radnih mjesta. 
 
Ključne riječi: porezni klin, troškovi rada, nezaposlenost, ekonomska politika, Hrvatska, 
OECD, EU 
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